Denver Law Review
Volume 40

Issue 5

Article 3

January 1963

Other Insurance Clauses - Multiple Coverage
Gordon H. Snow

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Gordon H. Snow, Other Insurance Clauses - Multiple Coverage, 40 Denv. L. Ctr. J. 259 (1963).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

1963

OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSES - MULTIPLE COVERAGE
By
I.

GORDON

H.

SNOW*

INTRODUCTION

When two or more insurance companies become exposed to
a single loss or claim as a result of policy language which extends
their respective coverage to the loss, it is frequently stated that
there exists the problem of "double coverage."
Where inconsistent "other insurance" clauses exist, the problem is a difficult one and usually comes into focus where "A"
carries liability coverage on his car with "drive other cars" protection and at the time of the accident he is driving "B's" car,
who also carries liability coverage which contains a so-called
omnibus clause,' which extends protection to anyone driving
"B's" car with the permission of the named insured. For immediate inquiry is the problem as to which insurance company will
cover the loss or claim, or, in other words, protect the liability
of "A" (and incidentally "B" if he becomes involved in the litigation which may result from the accident in which "A" was involved).
A determination of this perplexing program will probably
bring into play the following provisions of the policies in force:
1. Other insurance clauses;
2. Proration clauses;
3. Policy limit provisions;
4. Certain exclusions contained within the contracts of
insurance which limit or vitiate coverage while the
automobile is being used for a non-covered purpose.
A detailed discussion of the problems presented under these
provisions will be made subsequently. Meanwhile, suffice it to
say that much confusion and uncertainty in the law result from
the court's attempt to reconcile the problem. It is proper enough
to refer to this situation as a problem of double coverage but it
is manifestly enlarged when more than two insurance carriers
become exposed, in which event we are no longer thinking in
terms of "double coverage." A more appropriate term to apply
to this perplexing situation would be "multiple coverage" or
''concurrent insurance."
Just how confused and exasperated our courts are becoming
when presented with these hypertechnical problems where the
issue of multiple coverage exists, is manifestly demonstrated in
the court's opinion
in the case of American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Trans2
port Indem. Co.

This is another of the plethora of cases coming to the
courts in which insurance carriers engage in an internecine
struggle to determine which carrier should discharge a loss
under primary and "excess" coverage provisions. In en* Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
Pacific Indemnity Group, Los Angeles; PastPresident, International Association of Insurance Counsel.
1 The insurance afforded by this policy applies to any person or organization using or legally
responsible for the use of the automobile provided said automobile is used with the consent of
the name insured.
2200 Cal. App. 2d 543, 19 Cal. 558 (1962).
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tering the legalistic labyrinth of the provisions of the
policies, we are not favored, like Theseus, with any thread
of principle; each case apparently presents a particularistic
and unique problem. The obscurities of overlapping coverage have, indeed, led some experts to urge legislative clarification. In the absence of such statutory definition, our
efforts in interpreting the policies in this case have led us,
with one exception as to the apportionment of liability, to
the same basic conclusion as the trial judge.
A law review article,3 referred to by the judge in the abovecaptioned case, contained the following language:
Faced with the maze created by the policy provisions,
statutes, and varying concepts of the industry, it is not difficult to see why the courts have been unable to evolve a
rule which can establish tiers of liability for the insurers
and at the same time cover most of the situations in which
the problem arises. The clause matching method has proven
to be as unsatisfactory a solution as the earlier formulas
it replaced. Attempts to find the answer in a presumed
intent of the insurers, in the absence of binding contractual
relations between them, can only result in a case by case
handling of the conflicts.
In the absence of a solution through the policies themselves, legislative action appears to be the best remedy....
Such legislation should be directed toward producing
the greatest stability without needless duplication of administrative handling. Statutory control of the "other insurance" clauses appears to be the approach which will produce this result without undue complexity.
Much has been written on this subject and consequently the
law has frequently been exhaustively discussed. There would seem
to exist no prime need for exhaustive research and, as a result,
there can be no fresh and scintillating approach to the subject.
It shall, therefore, be the purpose of this material to cover the
law rather thoroughly to serve as a review and an exhaustive
reference to the authorities and, perhaps even more particularly,
to emphasize the nature of the problems, to call attention to the
reasons for the situations which lead to the problem and to
3 Russ, The Double Insurance Problem -

A Proposal, 13 Hastings L..

183, 191 (1961).
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generally discuss the matter from the viewpoint of the insurance
carrier.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

How is it possible for insurance companies to create situations
which conclude in such a seemingly hopeless myriad of legal red
tape and confusion? Even though it may appear that the carrier
by deliberate design has set out to entrap the unsuspecting public
and to otherwise jettison our courts by flooding them with insoluble legal problems, far be this from the truth. On the contrary,
it is out of spirit and purpose to provide the public with greater
protection, true, perhaps, dictated by competitive pressures in
the industry that the insurance companies have "opened" their
policies to offer greater protection in a wide variety of circumstances heretofore never contemplated. In so doing, it soon became
apparent that in extending coverage, there would be situations
where such extended coverage would carry over into areas otherwise protected by the policies of other insurance companies; and
even though there existed a genuine, sincere desire on the part
of the insurer to offer greater protection to the insured in a variety
of situations, it was not the purpose of the insurer to create a
situation where another insurer would gain incidental benefit
from the extended coverage offer to the extent that the carrier
would escape its liability altogether.
Hence the adoption of "other insurance" clauses designed to
overcome this problem which we today recognize as pro rata,
excess and escape clauses, so-called. The introduction of proration provisions and restricted use exclusions became a common
practice also in an effort to permit giving the insured greater
protection in a variety of situations without picking up a liability
which properly another carrier should take on and for which that
carrier received an adequate premium.
It has been urged by insurance company executives and in
some cases supported by the courts,' that where multiple coverages exist, they should be held invalid because of the moral hazard
which is manifest. This argument appears on its face a specious
one for, while there may exist this problem in direct property
insurance cases where an insured could collect two or more
times for the same loss, certainly such would not be the case
with reference to liability coverages where the issue being litigated is the legal liability of the insured wherein the insured
naturally receives no direct benefit other than to be secured or
not, as the case may be, against financial loss. The most that
could be said in the case of liability coverages is that the limits
have been increased as a result of the existence of multiple coverage, because this in itself should present no problem as the insured
is entitled to the limits for which premium has been paid.
The earlier cases in some instances permitted a totally inequitable result where an insured was entitled to the protection
of two policies but where each policy contained other insurance
escape clauses. The court, by literal interpretation, held that the
4 New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co. v. Morris Plan Bank of Portsmouth, 136 Va. 402, 118 S.E. 236 (1923).
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insured was entitled to no protection.i The inequity of this situation is immediately apparent, bearing in mind the fact that double
premium was paid for which no coverage was received. Presentday courts will in every instance strive to overcome this type of
inequity, for it is fully recognized that when an insured is penalized
for carrying too much insurance, it frequently results in a penalty
being imposed upon the innocent third party victim who is faced
with the problem of prosecuting his claim against frequently an
otherwise financially irresponsible wrongdoer. In other words,
the present-day courts tend more and more to view liability insurance contracts de facto as contracts made for the benefit of
third persons.
Even more difficult of solution is the residual inequity that
results from two insurers being in conflict, because of conflicting
other insurance clauses, as to their status concerning their respective contributions, if any, to a loss. Each admits he owes something or admits that he would owe the entire loss if it were not
for the existence of the other carrier's participation.
Frequently, feeling compelled to protect its legal position,
neither carrier will consent to a participation in liquidation of this
claim other than on its own terms, usually unacceptable to the
other carrier. This has the practical effect of creating a temporary
status of no insurance until the conflict has been resolved. Meanwhile, the insured and/or the claimant is left to his devices in
filing an action for breach of contract or he may unwittingly
become a party in an action or actions by the insurers for declaratory relief wherein the insurers seek to resolve their respective
differences during or before pendency of the case in chief by the
injured claimant. This unwholesome atmosphere gives rise to
unwarranted delay in liquidating the injured claimant's case,
often working a hardship upon him, and further tends to impose
upon the insured and the injured claimant costly and time-consuming litigation. Suggestions concerning a solution to this problem
will be made in the concluding paragraphs of this material.
III. THE PROBLEM
There are innumerable situations, far too many to permit an
exhaustive discussion herein, which lay the foundation for creation
of a problem and consequent litigation. However, for purposes of
this material, a discussion of a few basic factual situations will
highlight the problems presented:
1. "A" insured his automobile with "X" insurance
company with limits of $10,000/$20,000 (which policy contains a drive-other-car provision, and a pro rata, excess, or
escape clause). He has an accident while driving a truck
owned by "B" (assuming permissive use of the truck by
"B"), which is insured with "Y" insurance company with
limits of $50,000/$100,000 (which policy contains, among
other things, a standard omnibus clause and a pro rata, excess, or escape clause).
Query: Which company is liable to "A" and for what
limits?
5 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Copeland, 90 Ala. 386, 80 So. 48 (1890).
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2. "A," while operating "B's" vehicle (a truck), calls
at the premises of "C," a manufacturer of automobile parts,
who carries a general liability policy with "Z" insurance
company with limits of $100,000/$300,000 (which covers
use of automobiles on the insured premises and also contains a pro rata, excess, or escape clause). While assisting
"A" loading auto parts on the truck, one of "C's" employees
drops an object on "D," a passing member of the public,
who sues "A," "B," "C," and "C's" employee. "C" reports
the suit to "X," his insurance company, who in turn tenders the defense of the case to the insurers of "A" and "B"
under the famous lima bean case 6 on the theory that the
accident arose out of the loading and unloading provisions
of their policies, and therefore, "C" is entitled to primary
protection from "X" and "Y" insurance companies.
Query: Which carrier is liable to "C" and "C's" employee, and for what limits?
The answer to these questions will firstly depend
upon whether the state wherein the action is tried follows
the rule of the lima bean case. Thereafter, the liability of
"X" and "Y" will depend upon the other insurance clauses
which exist in their respective policies. Finally, assuming
the policies of "X" and "Y" insurance companies are exhausted, are "C" and "C's" employee entitled to excess coverage in "Z" insurance company?
3. "A" owns a commercial building containing three
stores rented to "M," "N," and "0." He carries a general
liability policy with "X" insurance company. "M," "N," and
"0" each carry general liability policies. "A" desires to sell
the building to "B," a banking institution, who purchases
same and simultaneously agrees to re-lease the building
back to "A" as a managing lessor. "B" carries general liability insurance. In the contract of lease-back, there is a
provision for right of re-entry by "B" onto the premises for
purposes of inspection of the total premises, including the
right to inspect the boiler plant which supplies heat to the
building. 7 Further in the contract of lease-back, there is a
6 Pleasant Valley Lima Bean Growers & Warehouse v. Cal-Farm Ins. Co.,
298 P.2d 109 (1956).
7 Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 375, 240 P.2d 580 (1952).
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provision whereby "A" agreed to provide acceptable insurance running in favor of "B" with limits of $100,000/$300,000. This he failed to do, carrying insurance only to protect
himself. Further in the same contract "B" agreed to supply
a boiler to heat the premises which "A" agreed to maintain
and operate. In the revised leases from "A" to tenants
"M," "N," and "0" there was a provision whereby said tenants agreed to carry liability insurance running in favor
of "A," which they did, with limits of $100,000/$300,000;
and further there was a provision that said tenants "M,"
"N," and "0" would share equally with sublessor "A" the
wages of an employee to operate and maintain the boiler
equipment which supplied heat to the building.
Due to the alleged negligence of the employee, the
boiler exploded, causing heavy injury and damage to various members of the public. Suits were filed against all
interests wherein "B" tendered defense of the action to
"A" and simultaneously filed a cause of action for "A's"
failure to secure the agreed insurance as set forth in the
contract of sale of the property, and also filed an action for
indemnity against "A." Meanwhile, "A" tendered defense
of the action to the insurers of "M," "N," and '0" who in
turn filed actions of indemnity over and against "A" and
"B" upon the theory that "A" and "B" were responsible for
the furnishing and maintenance of the boiler.
Query: What are the respective rights of the parties,
and which insurers are involved in the litigation, and to
what extent?
The above three examples are actual cases, the latter two of
which, up to this point, remain unsolved. This bar-examination
type of situation is presented to you herein for the sole purpose of
demonstrating how complicated actual situations can become in
dealing wi.h this troublesome area of the rights of the respective
carriers under the various types of conflicting other insurance and
proration clauses.
There are many situations found in the authorities which bring
into play the "other insurance" clauses of two or more policies.
Some of these situations are as follows:
1. A garage liability policy and a private automobile liability
policy.8
2. A private automobile liability policy as relates to another
private automobile liability policy where the insured is driving the automobile owned by another, this bringing into
play the omnibus provisions and the drive-other-car provisions of the respective policies.9
3. The omnibus clause of a private automobile liability policy
S Kenner v. Century Indem. Co., 320 Mass. 6, 67 N.E.2d 769, 165 A.L.R. 1463 (1946).
9 Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952); American
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pennsylavania Mut. Indern. Co., 162 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1947); Zurich Gen. Acc. &
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941); Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes, 74 So.
2d 367 (Fla.1954); Travelers Indem. Co. v. State Auto Ins. Co., 67 Ohio App. 457, 37 N.E.2d 198
(1941).
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and the provisions of a hired car and the hired car or nonownership provisions of another liability policy.' 0
4. A second automobile policy as relates to a first automobile
policy which the owner believed had been cancelled. 1
2
5. A conditional vendee's automobile policy.'
6. A comprehensive liability policy."

IV.

THE CASES

The courts sought at the outset to resolve the various problems
presented by adopting certain then-existing rules found in other
areas of law which they soon realized was not an appropriate and
proper solution. Some of the early theories or approaches to solution of the problem were as follows:
A. The Prior in Time View
In seeking to apply existing law to resolve conflicts flowing
from the existence of inconsistent other insurance clauses in "liability policies," the courts turn to numerous decisions found in
cases involving conflicting other insurance clauses in property insurance cases. It was observed that the courts in such cases had
followed the rule that the carrier having the earlier effective date
had the primary liability. 14 Later courts, however, recognizing the
futility of this approach, argued that the occurrence of the negligent
act of the assured has the effect of making both policies effective
simultaneously and thus has no bearing upon the time in which
the policy became effective.2 Most courts today have either ignored
or repudiated this theory of "prior in time."' 6
B. The Primary Wrongdoer Theory
Some of the earlier decisions were based upon the theory that
the insurer of the primary tortfeasor should respond to the primary
liability and that the insurer of anyone vicariously liable or secondarily liable would be in the position of excess coverage. While
this would appear at the outset to possess some merit, the practical
application of the doctrine
by the courts has resulted in almost an
7
impossible situation.'
C. Specific vs. General Coverage Theory
Some of the authorities have advanced in the past the doctrine
of imposing liability upon the coverage which is most specific in
10 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 108 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1940); Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 94 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1938); American Sur. Co. of N.Y. v.
American Indem. Co., 8 N.J. Super. 343, 72 A.2d 798 (1950); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 190 Minn. 528, 252 N.W. 434 (1934), rehearing denied 190 Minn 528, 253 N.W.
888 (1934).
11 Vrabel v. Scholler, 369 Pa. 235, 85 A.2d 858 (1953), rehearing denied 372 Pa. 578, 94 A.2d
748 (1953).
12 Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 158 (1955).
13 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 272 (D. Conn. 1953); Em.
ployers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 188 (1951).
14 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., supra note 10.
15 Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d 110 (1951), rehearing
denied 219 Ore. 110, 346 P.2d 643 (1951).
16 Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra note 9.
17 Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra note 9; American Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Penn Mut. Indem. Co., supra note 9; Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co.,
supro note 13; Consolidated Shippers, Inc. v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 288, 114 P.2d
34 (1941); Maryland Consolidated Cos. Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 51 Ohio App. 323 (1935).
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its application to a loss as compared to the coverage which is less
specific or general in nature. This concept, perhaps borrowed from
property coverages and particularly fire insurance, actually possessed little merit or substance when applied to liability coverages
and the courts gradually refused to attempt to make the refined
distinction necessary to make the doctrine work, and thus the concept has fallen into disuse.'8
V.

OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSES AND THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF THEM

1. Pro Rata Provisions:
Under this type of provision the insurer obligates itself
to ratably share in the loss in the same proportion with
another or other carriers its limits bear to the total available coverage of all other valid and collectible insurance. 19
2. Excess Provisions:
These clauses are generally in wide use and briefly
provide that the insurance otherwise available shall be
excess over and above any other
valid and collectible in20
surance available to the insured.
3. Escape or Void Provisions:
These clauses, also in fairly common usage, provide in
substance that the insurance otherwise provided, under the
terms of the insurance contract, is null and void in the
21
event there exists other valid and collectible insurance.
The authorities indicate that unless there exists a conflict in
the other insurance clauses of two or more policies, such clauses
will normally be recognized and held valid. Problems arise, however, when a conflict in the other insurance or proration clauses
exists and it is this problem which so frequently is presented to the
courts and in consequence precipitates various and inconsistent
rulings in a variety of situations. There is, however, an emerging
uniformity in many cases where similar situations have been before our courts with some frequency. From the rules handed down
18
Corp.
supro
19
20
21

Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra note 9; Employers tiab. Assur.
v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co., supra note 13; Consolidated Shippers, Inc. v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co.,
note 17.
Woodrich Constr. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 252 Minn. 86, 89 N.W. 2d 412 (1958).
Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 224 Ore. 57, 355 P.2d 742 (1960).
Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Publish. Co., supra note 10.
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and approved in many of these cases, certain reasonably reliable
conclusions can be deduced.
22

A. Matching or Pairing of "Other Insurance Clauses"
Many courts look with favor upon matching or pairing other
insurance clauses as a logical and equitable solution to inconsistent
other insurance provisions. Thus, if the policy contracts under consideration both or all contain excess clauses, a proration generally
is ordered.2 3 The reasoning of the courts suggests that the same
holding would obtain where conflicting contracts both or all contain escape clauses. Obviously, where both or all contracts contain
proration clauses, the courts will give effect to the language contained in those contracts and will order a proration.
There is a noticeable trend toward retrenchment from the
matching or pairing approach to solution of incompatible other insurance clauses, particularly in situations where there are more
than two policies of insurance involved and where two of them
match but a third mismatches. The courts find it difficult to reconcile which two of the clauses should be matched first and what the
ultimate fate therefore is of the insurer with a third inconsistent
clause or mismatched clause. It becomes manifest that in situations
of this kind there is absent complete equity to all parties concerned,
it having been argued in many instances that using the matching
or pairing formula results in an inequity to the insurer whose purpose it was to write a limited or contingent form of coverage at a
reduced premium, contemplating that its coverage would become
effective only after other primary coverage was exhausted. From
an underwriting standpoint, this does point up a substantial objection to this method of solving these problems but the courts have
taken a somewhat arbitrary and detached view of the insurer's
fate in such cases, arguing that if the insurance company who becomes participating at the primary level in disposition of a claimeven though he did not intend this to be the situation-did not
charge enough premium, and it is exposed, it simply made a bad
bargain and is bound by it.
In any event, the courts apparently will refuse to adopt any
formula for the reconciliation of conflicting other insurance and
proration clauses which precipitates a forfeiture in whole or in part
of any coverage which otherwise would be available. The courts
now uniformly appear to accept the premise that where premium
has been paid for coverage that coverage will be made available
to the assured without embarrassment to him in interpreting the
hypertechnical provisions of the policies of two or more insurers
which may be involved in the loss.
B. Mismatching of Other Insurance Clauses
It is in this area of the problem where we find the greatest
fluctuation of authority, demonstrated by the court's struggle to
produce a result that is consistent with the contract language and
still is equitable and compatible with the holdings of other juris22 38 Minn. L. Rev. 838 (1954); 5 Stan. L. Rev. 147 (1952).
23 Oil Base, Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 453, 299 P.2d 953 (1956).
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dictions. Consequently, many fluctuations are found, depending
largely upon the area wherein the litigation is brought.
1. Pro Rata vs. Excess Clause.-The majority opinions indicate
that they will ignore the pro rata clause, ordering
it to be primary
24
coverage and giving effect to the excess clause.
2. Pro Rata vs. Escape Clause.-There appears to be no uniformity in the decisions treating with this problem. Some courts
give effect to the pro rata provision, ' 5 and other courts to the escape
clause.26 The California courts, particularly, who give effect to the
pro rata clause in preference to the escape clause reach this conclusion upon the theory that lending validity to the escape clause
would cut down
the available insurance in force for which premium
2 7
had been paid.
3. Excess vs. Escape Clause.-The courts tend in this situation
to lend validity to the excess provisions rather than the escape provisions for the reason indicated above; namely, that to do otherwise
results in a reduction of the available insurance to the policyholder.
Thus the clauses are matched as though they were Excess vs. Excess, and they, therefore, become pro rata. -'8
However, there are courts who have held the escape clause
valid as against the excess clause, ignoring the fact that it precip29
itates a reduction in available insurance to the insured.
C. New Developments
1. Increased Usage of "Excess" Clauses.-We are currently
seeing an increase in the number of reported decisions wherein the
policies involved both contain excess clauses, thus requiring proration between the carriers.3 0
Those reported decisions generally involve policies written for
automobile leasing companies, but in the day-to-day handling of
claims, insurance companies are also being more frequently confronted with coverage problems wherein an insurer has substituted
a strictly "excess" clause for the "standard" clause used by most
companies on their automobile liability policies.
The effect of substituting the "excess" clause for the "standard"
clause is to distort the traditional coverage picture. Whereas normally the insurer of the automobile owner would be primarily
liable, the substitution of clauses permits such an insurer to obtain
24 Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1959); Employers
Liab. Assur. Cora. v. Fir,mrr's Fnd- Ins. Gr., 262 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1958); McFarl'nd v. Chicago
Exp., Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co. of America,
52 Cal. 2d 467, 341 P.2d 675 (1959); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal. App.
2d 192, 318 P.2d 84 (1957), 76 A.L.R.2d 502; Speier v. Ayling, 158 Pa. Super. 404, 45 A.2d 385 (1946).
25 Peerless Cos. Co. v. Continental Cos. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 301 P.2d 602 (1956); Air
Transp. Mfg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 129, 204 P.2d 647 (1949).
26 McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., supra note 24.
27 Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cos. Co., supra note 25.
28 Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, supra note 9; Continental Cos. Co. v. Curtis Publish. Co., supra note 10; Grassberger v. Liebert & Obert, Inc., 335 Pa. 491, 6 A.2d 925 (1939).
29 Contirental Ccs. Co. v. Sutlenf'eld. 236 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1956); Employers Liob. Assur. Corp.
v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co., supra note 13 - (The court in this instance, however, matched the two
escape clauses and ended up with a proration).
30 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Not. Ins. Co., 202 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. W. Va. 1962); Athey v.
Netherlands Ins. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 10, 19 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1962); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Torres, 193
Cal. App. 2d 483, 14 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1961); Continental Cos. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 28
Cal. Rp:r. 606 (Calif. 1963); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Continental Nati Gr., 28 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Calif.
1963).
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contribution from the insurer of a permissive user whose policy
would normally be excess.
As the companies continue to maneuver into a more favorable
position and to refine their efforts to shift their burden to other
carriers, we may see more and more companies resort to the use
of a strictly "excess" clause.
2. Apportionment of the Cost of Defense Between Insurers.While it may not be immediately apparent from a reading of the
decisions, those persons intimately familiar with the problem of
deciding whether to assume the defense of a lawsuit on behalf of
their insured or to refuse to enter such a defense with the hope that
the other carrier involved would step forward, will acknowledge
that they may have been influenced by the knowledge that in many
jurisdictions the carrier which once assumed the defense of the insured could not recover any of the expenses incurred by reason of
such defense.
Such was the law in California until a recent case in which the
supreme court specifically disapproved prior decisions which had
stated that the duty to defend was personal to both insurers and
thus, neither was entitled to divide that duty with the other.31 The
court noted that the services contemplated by the agreement to
defend are not personal but rather are for the benefit of the insurance company and for the benefit of other obligated insurers, as
well as for the benefit of the insured, and ruled that under general
principles of equitable subrogation, all obligated carriers who have
refused to defend should be required to share in costs of the insured's defense. The court also noted: "A contrary result would
simply provide a premium or offer a possible windfall for the insurer who refuses to defend, and thus, by leaving the insured to
his own resources, enjoys a chance that the costs of defense will be
provided by some other insurer at no expense to the ' company
32
which declines to carry out its contractual commitments.
Since the supreme court has resolved the issue in California,
some companies appear to be somewhat more realistic in resolving
the conflicts of coverage. While this current development applies
only in California and a few other jurisdictions ,3 it may indicate
31 Continental Cos. Co. v. Zurich Ins., 17 Col. Rptr. 12, 366 P.2d 455 (1961).
32 Id. at 18, 366 P.2d 461.
33 General Ace. F. & L. Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Smith & Oby Co., 272 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1959);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 164 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. N.Y. 1958); Bituminous Cas.
Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1954).
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a trend which may ultimately contribute generally to earlier and
more amicable settlement of coverage disputes.
Time and space will not permit inclusion of a digest of all the
cases reported in the United States on this perplexing problem.
Attention is called to the excellent work of Risjord and Austin
under the title "Automobile Liability Insurance Cases," in three
volumes, published by E. L. Mendenhall, Inc., Kansas City, Missouri. The unusual, excellent index contained in the Table of Chapters, Outline of Cases, and Supplementary Table of Cases, dated
March, 1961, contains headings 3 4under which are listed all of the
cases interpreting each heading.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

While it is not possible to extract "cookbook" rules which will
apply to every case to bring about a consistent end result, it is
nevertheless possible to form certain conclusions which appear to
be relatively dependable.
1. The courts will no longer accept such a literal interpretation
of contracts of insurance which produces the end result of voiding
or limiting the insurance coverage to the insured upon the broad
premise that the premium was paid for the total insurance and it
should therefore be made available to the insured.
2. Where inconsistent other insurance clauses are matched or
paired, they will in most cases be held to be pro rata.
3. Where inconsistent other insurance clauses are mismatched,
the courts will usually order a solution which will have for its purpose providing the full amount of insurance available to the insured as indicated in the situation set forth hereinabove.
The court's attitude with reference to the problem of other
insurance is well expressed in the Lamb-Weston, Inc. case, 35 wherein appears the following language:
"Other insurance" clauses of all policies are but methods used by insurers to limit their liability, whether using
language that relieves them from all liability (usually referred to as an "escape clause") . . . or that used by Oregon
(usually referred to as a "prorata clause"). In our opinion,
whether one policy used one clause or another, when any
come in conflict with the "other insurance" clauses of another insurer, regardless of the nature of the clause, they
are in fact repugnant and each should be rejected in toto. 36
VII.

THE SOLUTION

It has been expressed by a number of authorities that the hopeless confusion precipitated by the use of other insurance clauses
34 (1) Prorated according to policy limits; (2) Prorated according to premiums paid; (3) Prorated equally without regard to oolicy limits; (4) Prorated equitably where all policies purport to be
excess; (5) All policies purport to be excess; (6) Three policies excess of a fourth; (7) Two policies
are excess of a third; (8) One policy is excess; (9) One policy is purchased by named insured; (10)
Policyholders agree (That driver's policy will cover driver's liability while operating owner's automobile.); (11) Two insurers cover person secondarily liable; (12) One insurer as volunteer by paying
more than its share; (13) Insured as real party in interest where he settles judgment w;th funds borrowed under a loan agreement with one insurer; (14) Effect on claim expenses; (15) Effect on costs;
(16) Effect on interest.
35 Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 15.
36 Id. at 119.
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OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSES

by insurance companies to prevent another insurer from incidentally benefiting from the broad coverage interwoven into these
various
policies, can only be avoided by the adoption of legisla3
tion.
Sober consideration of this suggested method of overcoming
the problems under consideration points to serious doubt as to
whether legislation is in fact a logical and proper solution:
1. There exists a myriad of situations in the underwriting of risks that require the writing of highly specialized forms of coverage which could not conceivably be contemplated by a statutory approach to the unsatisfactory
consequences resulting from these various forms of coverages.
2. The insurance industry as a private industry has
an obligation to serve the insurance requirements of the
public and as such should be prepared to write virtually
any form of coverage which is designed to meet a particular situation at a premium which is considered to be reasonable and proper under the circumstances. Any attempt
to place into government hands the responsibility which
presently rests with the insurance business as a private industry will tend ultimately to destroy the competitive advantages which naturally flow from private enterprise.
3. The existence of statutory uniform contracts will
tend to bring the insurance business closer to government
control and the ultimate capture of the industry by governmental agencies. This socialization of America's greatest
industry would change the form and substance of private
industry and would put America well on the road to the
ultimate social state.
The solution, therefore, must result from a program of selfdiscipline and self-correction which it is within the power of the
various segments of industry to accomplish in lieu of abandonment
of the problem to governmental control.
It is submitted that through the various insurance bureaus and
associations which today exist in the United States, wherein the
entire insurance industry is represented in one way or another,
there exists the capacity and the know-how to undertake an exhaustive study of the problem with the ultimate objective of adopting statements of guiding principles. This would be adhered to by
all of the industry covering all of the conceivable situations which
could result from the existence of multiple coverage and conflicting
proration clauses, and would still preserve the ability of the industry to provide special forms of coverages at appropriate premium rates.
Coupled with this formula approach to a solution of the problem should be a program for liquidation of any disputes outside the
statements of guiding principles not anticipated by the draftsmen
of those principles, through the medium of arbitration, thus removing the costly and unsatisfactory method of litigating such issues.
37 26 Ins. Counsel J. 93, 411 (1959); Russ, The Double Insurance Problem ings L.J.183 (1961); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Torres, supra note 30.
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